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Zusammenfassung 
Vorläufige Sicherheitsbewertung des NET Magnetsystems 
Im vorliegenden Bericht wird der Entwurf des NET/ITER Magnetsystems 
beschrieben, zusätzlich sind die bisher in supraleitenden Magneten aufge-
tretenen Fehler zusammengestellt. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden denkbare 
Störfälle diskutiert und sogenannte Referenzstörfälle abgeleitet. Das Inventar an 
Radioaktivität im Magnetsystem ist gering; es stellt sich aber die Frage, ob seine 
hohe gespeicherte Energie zu Störfällen führen kann, bei denen Radioaktivität-
führende Systeme verletzt werden. 
Von besonderer Bedeutung sind daher jene Ereignisse, die das Potential haben, 
sich vom Magnetsystem auf benachbarte Komponenten, die Radioaktivität 
umschließen, fortzupflanzen. Folgende Ereignisse werden in diesem Sinne als 
kritisch eingestuft: 
(1) Unkontrolliertes Wachsen einer normalleitenden Zone, (2) Kurzschlüsse und 
Lichtbogen außerhalb und innerhalb einer Magnetspule, (3) Deformation oder 
Verschiebung einer Spule und (4} Volumenänderungen des Kältemittels Helium. 
Der Hauptteil des Berichtes befaßt sich mit Analysen zu den Punkten (1) bis (3}, 
d. h. konkret mit dem thermischen Versagensverhalten, dem Verhalten von Kurz-
schlüssen und Lichtbogen sowie den mechanischen Konsequenzen von elektri-
schen Fehlern. 
Die bisher bei KfK durchgeführten Untersuchungen unterstreichen die Bedeu-
tung von Quenchereignissen, von Kurzschlüssen und Lichtbogen sowie von me-
chanischen Reaktionen der Struktur des Magnetsystems. 
Abstract 
After a characterization of the magnet system for the conceptual design of ITER 
previous failures of superconducting magnets are briefly reviewed. Possible 
accidents are discussed leading to the definition of so-called reference accident 
sequences. Since the magnet system does not contain significant radioactivity 
inventories the large stored energies are considered mainly to have the potential 
to initiate or enhance accidents. 
Of most concern are those events having a potential to propagate from the 
magnet system to adjacent radioactivity confining components. ln this sense, the 
following events are considered to have a potential of failure propagation: 
(1) Uncontrolled growing of anormal conduction zone, (2) shorts and arcs outside 
and inside a coil, (3) coil deformation or displacement, and (4) volume change of 
cryogenic helium. 
The main part of the report deals with the assessment of items (1) to (3), this 
means in detail thermal failures, the behaviour of shorts and arcs, and the 
mechanical consequences of electrical faults. 
The investigations performed up to now at KfK indicate the significance of 
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Superconducting magnets for a fusion machine represent components with 
considerable requirements for advanced technology, high performance and 
reliability. The safe and reliable operation of the magnet system is an essential 
Supposition for an appropriate availability and economic operation of the whole 
plant. 
The magnet system may be subdivided into the following major subsystems: 
the toroidal field (TF) coils 
the poloidal field (PF) coils 
the supporting structures and cryostat 
the cryogenic system 
the TF and PF power supply and protection systems 
the coil services and diagnostics. 
The main objective of this report is the investigation of conceivable magnet 
system failures. 
Since the induced radioactivity in the coils is comparatively small the safety 
assessments of superconducting magnets point at the following questions: 
Does the relatively large amount of stored energies within the superconducting 
magnets jeopardize the safe operation of the magnet system? Are there initiators 
and subsequent sequences of events which might Iead to displacements or 
destruction of magnets and in consequence to a destruction of structures 
confining radioactivity? 
Disturbances in the magnets such as a quench, a short or an arc may Iead to heat 
production in the coil, to strong nonsymmetrical electromagnetic forces, and to a 
pressure rise in helium-filled conductors or containers. After detection of the 
disturbance the energy is usually dumped in external resistors. Safety relevant 
events are therefore those where this energy transfer is hindered or even made 
impossible. This is conceivable for various shorts and arcs arrangements within 
one coil or in the cryostat, or in the power supply/dump circuits. 
When considering the status of the magnet design for NET and ITER the available 
references show that the most developed and consistent concept is the 
conceptual design of ITER. Hence, the database used in the following isthat of 
ITER, and the considerations refer to the NET/ITER magnet system. 
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2. Characterization of the Magnet System 
2.1 Functions of the Magnet 
The NET/ITER magnet system comprises the TF coils and the PF coils and different 
additional sub-systems necessary for the safe and reliable operation of the system 
as a whole. 
There are 16 superconducting TF coils in NET/ITER and three typs of PF coils: 
the central solenoid coils as the main transformer coils 
the outer PF ring coils 
the inner PF coils. 
The TF coils produce ring shaped closed magnetic field lines keeping field ripple 
at the plasma edge below 2.5%. ln order to compensate field gradients and drifts 
of particles a poloidal magnetic field is superimposed leading to helical guiding 
magnetic field lines and allowing variations over a range of plasma parameters. 
The poloidal magnetic field is a combination of fields produced on one hand by 
ring coils concentric to the torus forming the primary winding of the Ohrnie 
Heating (OH) transformer, and on the other hand by the plasma which acts as 
secondary winding of this transformer. The plasma current is induced by a 
unidirectional change of magnetic flux. The flux transient can be sustained only 
for a finite time, hence the PF coils have to be operated in a pulsed mode. 
Another function of the magnets is to purify and protect the plasma from impu-
rities. By special shaping of the magnetic field a "last" closed magnetic surface is 
provided (called separatrix). The charged particles from the plasma having cros-
sed the separatrix and impurities from the first wall within the edge-layer be-
tween separatrix and first wall may be exhausted by the divertor system. 
ln conclusion, the main functions of the magnets are the following: 
to heat the plasma 
to confine the plasma 
to control plasma current 
to position the plasma 
to shape the plasma and provide a divertor field. 
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With the exception of the inner PF coil the magnets are superconducting. To 
establish the superconducting state, thermal insulation and cooling are 
important auxiliary functions. 
2.2 Design Boundary Conditions and Design Data Base 
TF and PF coils with the associated support structure are contained by the cryo-
stat. The cryostat forms the first barrier against release of radioactivity from the 
magnet systems caused by a severe magnet failure including arcing induced 
material vaporization.The design value for an internal accidental overpressure of 
the ITER cryostat is assumed tobe 2 bar (absolute). 
The main data are referred totheITER Magnets [1].The principai arrangement of 
the TF and PF magnets are illustrated in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 taken from [ 1 ]. 
Three different states for the TF and PF coils have been distinguished [ 1]: 
Normaloperation 
While the TF coils are operated by the nominal constant current, the PF coils 
are ramped to drive and control the plasma. An oscillation of the PF coil 
current is assigned for sweeping the strike point across the divertor. Plasma 
disruptions are assumed to occur. 
Du ring normal operation the coils must not quench. 
Abnormal or upset operation 
Occurring events can be coil quench, loss of coolant or loss of power, loss of 
cryostat vacuum, and earthquake. ln any case the coils must be shut down 
safely and without damage. 
Fault conditions 
Among these are events like failure of the protection system (control failure), 
electrical short circuit, electrical open circuit (e.g. Iead break), and mechanical 
failure. 
There is a strong demand to restriet the darnage to the coil within its case and 
to confine possible radioactivity release within the cryostat. 
For the superconducting magnets mechanical Ioads arising from coupling 
processes between the coils have dominating influence on the operating condi-
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tions. ln the case of failures like shorts and arcs the occurring asymmetric current 
and Ioad distributionwill be further enhanced by electromagnetic coupling. 
Other design constraints result from cryogenic temperatures, the heat Ioad, and 
the radiation induced degradation of materials. Finally, the requirements of re-
mote maintenance have tobe taken into account. 
2.2.1 TF Coils 
Design criteria, the design concept, and the analysis of the TF coils are described 
in [1]. The general features are listed in Table 2-1, taken from [1]. 
Table 2-1: General Features of the TF Magnets 
Number of TF coils 
Total stored energy (GJ) 
Total current per coil (MA) 
Magnetdimensions (including case): 
Horizontal clear bore (m) 
Vertical clear bore (m) 
Clear bore dia. for CS (m) 
Outer radial extent (m) 
Height (m) 
Field on axis (at 6.0 m) (T) 
Maximum field at the windings (T) 
Winding pack description: 
Packdimensions (m x m) 
Mean pack current density (A/mm2) 
Number of turns 
Conductor current (kA) 
Mass of the windings (t) 

















For the time being there are different options for the ITER superconductors. 
However, all of them have the following basic features: cable of composite 
strands, internal flow cooling by helium of supercritical pressure and a steel tube 
jaket. The principal configuration of one conductor of a cable-in-conduit type 
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and one of monolithic type are illustrated in Fig. 3. ln both cases the ternary 
Nb3 Sn superconductor is surrounded by a chromium plated copper stabilizer. The 
maximum hot spot temperature is assumed at 150 K for abnormal or upset 
operation. 
ln the conceptual design of ITER there aredifferent designs of winding packs. On 
principle two types can be distinguished: the one pack design and a design oftwo 
symmetric halves. 
Corresponding to the two types of winding packs there are again two types of 
coil cases. 
Since the coils are cooled down and charged up for long periods the main 
components of the loadings, the in-plane loadings, remain constant. However, 
the pulsed operation of the machine Ieads to cycling out-of-plane Ioads. 
Therefore the total normal operating Ioads are a mixing of static and cyclic stress 
conditions. 
Other loadings on structures are caused by gravity, differential thermal 
expansions, preloading, disruptions, quench effects and fault loading. Fault 
induced Ioads may be more severe, however, they should be less frequent. 
The inner verticallegs of the coils are formed into a rigid central vault structure. 
Hence, the inward force on each leg is reacted by a toroidal compression within 
the vault. The forces produced by the poloidal field and acting normal to the TF 
coil plane vary around its perimeter. They result in zero net force but in an 
overturning moment about the coil symmetry axis. The central vault and the 
outer intercoil structure have to cope with these forces and moments. 
2.2.2 PF Coils 
Design criteria, the conceptual design, and various analyses are described in the 
ITER Documentation Series [ 1 and 2]. There are three separate sets of PF coils: 
The central solenoid with four up-down pairs (labelled PF 1 to PF 4) of 
superconducting coils. Besides the main function acting as transformer coils 
the solenoid also contributes to 'the plasma equilibrium. The solenoid is 
characterized by limited space and large compressive forces, hence, limiting 
the inductive drive of the plasma current. The maximum field close to the 
winding is 13.5 Tatinitial energization. 
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The main superconducting coils outside the TF coils comprising three up-down 
pairs (labelled PF 5, PF 6 and PF 7). These outer PF coils serve for generating 
the plasma equilibrium fields and part of the inductive flux for the plasma. 
They have a position control function on a slow timescale of a few seconds. 
The coils are cooled by forced flow helium. The maximum conductor current is 
30- 40 kA. The maximum fields close to the windings are in the 5 to 8 T range, 
with a maximumrate of change of about 2.5 T/s. 
A pair of water-cooled normal conducting active control coils within the va-
cuum vessel (not shown in fig. 1). They stabilize the vertical position of the 
plasma and control fast vertical displacements. The single turn copper coils 
have a ceramic insu!ation to withstand high radiation dose. 
The PF system shall provide plasma configurations and different plasma 
operatingseenarios both for the Physics Phase and the Technology Phase of ITER. 
The nominal plasma current is 22 MA. ln the Physics Phase, besides the baseline 
ignition mode with a burn time of 400 s, different extended operation modes are 
foreseen with plasma currents of 25 and 28 MA and burn times from 35 s to more 
than 400 s. The Technology Phaseoperation needs lower plasma currents, how-
ever, Ionger burn times up to quasi steady state operation are planned. 
As mentioned above, from the safety point of view three different operation 
states have been distinguished. According to these three operation categories 
the design of the PF coils has to take into account the following Ioads [3]: 
1. For normal operation 
- Magnetic hoop Ioads 
- Magnetic out-of-plane Ioads 
- Gravity forces 
- Thermalstresses du ring cool-down and warm-up 
- Preload stress to maintain contact between winding pack and support 
structure 
- lmposed displacement/rotation to the PF5 coil from support system 
attached to the TF coils 
- Ripple loading due to the PF component from the TF coils 
- A change in magnetic hoop Ioad and magnetic out-of-plane Ioad during a 
disruption. 
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2. For abnormal operation 
- Quench stress resulting from the heated helium, and from differential 
thermal stresses in the winding 
- Extra ripple loading from the poloidal component of the TF coils fields due 
to non-simultaneaus discharge of the two PF coil circuits 
- Earthquake Ioads. 
3. For faulted operation 
- Exceptional hoop or vertical forces due to failure of the power supply 
control system 
- Exceptional hoop or vertical forces due to a coil short circuit 
- High ripple loading due to a poloidal field from the TF coils when one of 
these is in a faulted condition. 
Like the TF coils, the PF coils need cooling facilities to guarantee the operating 
temperature conditions. 
2.2.3 Impacts on the Coils 
As mentioned above the magnets are subjected to different operationalloads to 
be analyzed during the design process. Among these are the pulse Ioads 
produced by the PF coils. Time variable magnetic fields induce eddy currents in 
the structures with the consequence of ohrnie heating and mechanicalloads. 
Whilst the ohrnie heating and other thermal Ioads yield the inputs to the specifi-
cation of the cryogenic system, the mechanical Ioads have tobe accomodated by 
a proper design of the structures. 
An important impact on the design of the magnets and their supporting 
structures will result from plasma disruptions. Plasma disruptions are considered 
to be a normal operation status for the magnets. Hence, during a severe plasma 
disruption stable operation is required. For the magnets only the electromagnetic 
effects of a disruption are of relevance. The consequences of these effects are 
sudden field/current changes in the TF and especially PF coils with high indu-
ced coil voltages and alternating current (AC) losses. The AC Iosses should be 
removed by the coolant in due time suchthat the critical temperature for the 
superconductor arenot reached. 
eddy currents in the structures near the plasma. These induced currents inter-
act with the magnetic fields and produce electromagnetic Ioads. The induced 
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currents and Ioads predominantly influence the in-vessel components and the 
vacuum vessel. The coil casings and support structures are subjected to only 
minor Ioads, which do not contribute to the overallload determination. 
The superconducting cable is designed for a time scale of the plasma current 
decay in the order of 20 ms. This may yield field changes of 40 T/s in the peak 
field region of the TF coils in the vault. Disruption induced Iosses include hystere-
sis Iosses in the superconductor, coupling Iosses in the cable, eddy current loss in 
the conduit due to the transverse and parallel field components. Assuming a 
coupling time constant of 10 ms the local AC Iosses due to plasma disruptions are 
calculated with 93 mJ/cm3 in the cable for the TF coils, 160 mJ/cm3 for PF1 to PF4, 
and 5 mJ/cm3 for the PF coils 5 to 7 [1 ]. 
An effect resulting from plasma disruptions may be a quench of the PF 
transformer coil since the high dB/dt values could exceed the capability of the 
cooling.Aiso a quench of a TF coil following a plasma disruption mainly due to 
conductor slip has been judged possible. A quench could be the initiating event 
for an uncontrolled heat-up of the concerning coil. This accident is considered in 
chapter 4.1. 
The structural analysis of the TF coils both under normal and different fault 
conditions as performed during the conceptual design phase of ITER are 
illustrated in [1 ]. lt shows the rather complex interrelation between the various 
electromagnetic Ioads and the mechanical behaviour of the coil system and its 
structure. Further analyses for the case of a short circuit and an open circuit seem 
tobe necessary in order to find a design solution with a minimum slip of the inner 
legs. 
With regard to the PF coils especially the central solenoid needs a very exacting 
design. Precompression of the winding packs is necessary to prevent gaps 
between packs and support flanges due to outward vertical forces dependent on 
the current Scenario. 
Since pulsed operation of the PF system imposes cyclic loading on all magnet 
structures, fatigue in structural components is a critical issue. A failure of the 
sheath of a cable-in-conduit conductor can occur mainly in the weid zone when a 
growing crack penetrates the wall casing and causes a leak. The material data 
base for fatigue crack growth rate (FCGR) in the temperature region of 4 K and 
the detectability of small flaws is still limited. However, recent results show that 
the FCGR in the weldings is lower compared tothat of the basemeta I and further 
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that the fatigue life of material is sufficient (106 Ioad cycles) at cryogenic 
temperatures [4]. 
A thermohydraulic analysis has been performed [1] to determine the helium mass 
flow necessary to remove the heat Ioads with restricted temperature increase and 
pressure drop. The second aim of this analysis is to assess the location of the 
minimum temperature margin along the pancake length. 
There is a relatively large nuclear heat input on the plasma facing side of the 
straight legs of the TF coils. Hence the minimum temperature margin is located in 
the firstturn of the winding. The temperature distribution is mostly governed by 
nuclear heating, heat conduction and radiation to the environment, and 
frictionallosses in the coolant. The contribution by the AC ioss transient heat flux 
is of minor importance. 
Another constraint influencing the magnet design is the nuclear radiation. Tomi-
nimize the heat production within the coils, and to keep the radiation damages 
especially in the insulation materials within allowable Iimits shielding against nu-
clear radiation is necessary. The thickness of the shielding structures, e.g. the 
shielding blanket, has to guarantee that the specified dose Iimitation for the su-
perconducting coils arenot exceeded up to the end of NET operation time. 
The radiation Iimits for the TF coils are due to the copper stabilizer, the epoxy 
insulation and the cooling. The copper stabilizers are subjected to a radiation 
induced increase in resistance. Generally the radiation darnage to the insulation 
by a degradation in the structural and electric properties is the most restrictive 
parameter. 
For the radiation exposure of the ITER TF coils the Ieveis listed in Table 2-2 were 
assumed under the condition that a careful design and suitable materials are 
applied [1]. 
Concerning the neutron activation of magnet materials it is far less than that of 
plasma facing components and limited due to the necessary shielding against 
heat deposition and radiationdarnage of conductors and insulators. An exempla-
ry activation assessment for NET conditions (neutron wall loading = 1 MW/m2 
after 1 yr of exposure) indicates that the near-term induced activity of magnet 
materials requires remote handling. Longterm activity is low allowing hands-on 
recycling of the magnet materials [5]. 
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Table 2-2: Levels of Radiation Darnagetobe Tolerated Du ring 
the Operationallife of the Magnet Systems 
lnsulator dose (Gy) 
Copper darnage (dpa) 
Neutron fluence (n/m2) 
(E > 0.1 MeV) 
2 x 107 (average) 
5 x 107 (peak, i.e. 
average over one 
conductor width) 
5 X 10-4 
1 X 1023 
Under accident conditions the induced radioactivity may be of relevance in the 
case of arcing where melting and evaporation of material occur. This would Iead 
to the contamination of the next barrier. 
Besides the nuclear radiation the non-ionizing radiation of the electric, magnetic 
and electromagnetic fields resulting from the magnets, their power supply, and 
RF heating facilities has its impact on the plant design. 
Protective measures will be necessary for the station statt and also for different 
electronic equipment. The potential hazard to the public seems to be of minor 
importance due to the performed protection of the workers which is mandatory 
in any case. Dose Iimits, both for the workers and the public, have tobe observed. 
2.2.4 Cryogenic System 
The cryogenic system has to provide cooling for the superconducting coils, and 
for various other Subsystems of the plant, e.g. the current Ieads, the cryopumps, 
the fuel processing and RF heating systems. Concerning the magnet system the 
total cooling weight amounts to 12000 tons. For normal operation the average 
heat Ioads ofthe magnet system are in the order of 100 kW. 
The coils are cooled by forced flow supercritical helium with an inlet temperature 
of 4.5 K, an outlet temperature of about 6 K, and an inlet pressure of 5 - 10 bar. 
The total mass flow rate is 10- 15 kg/s and the pressure drop amounts to 1 -4 bar 
[ 1 ] . 
For off-normal operation, i.e. in the case of a coil quench, the helium inside the 
magnet should be drained to a recovE;ry tank without delay in order to Iimit the 
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pressure rise in the magnet. The emergency storage of helium seems to need 
further investigations. 
2.2.5 Power Supply and Control Systems 
The power supply systems consist of three different groups: 
1. The power supply of the TF coils 
The main components are: 
- Transformer from high voltage supply 
- Converter 
- Discharge circuit breakers 
- Discharge resistors 
2. The power supply of the PF coils 
The main components for each coil or each coil pair are: 
- Transformers from high voltage supply 
- Converters, switches and resistors to extract energy from coil system and to 
switch converter configuration 
- Discharge circuit breakers 
- Discharge resistor 
3. The power supply of the active control coils 
The main components are: 
- Transformer from high voltage supply 
- Fastresponse amplifier. 
The magnet power supply systems have two main functions: to provide the 
power to generate the fields for the magnetic confinement and control of the 
plasma, and to protect the coils by a safe energy discharge system. The protection 
circuits of the TF and PF magnets are planned to provide a fast discharge in the 
case of a coil quench with a time constant of 10 s, and a slow discharge in pre-
emergency situations with a dischargetime of 0.5 h. 
The stored energy in the TF coils is 42.3 GJ. ln the PF coils the variable stored 
energy and the high coupling between coils yield complex discharge conditions. 
ln the different coils the maximum values of the stored energy vary in the range 
from 1.0 to 5.0 GJ [6]. 
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Due to the hazard potential of the stored electromagnetic energy, because of the 
high investment costs, and due to the fact that the superconducting coils ·are 
considered to be semi-permanent components the reliable protection of the 
magnet system is an essential general demand. 
For the quench protection system the following parameters are defined [ 1]: the 
maximum hot-spot temperature must not exceed 150 K, the maximum coil 
voltage between terminals or between a terminal and ground is limited to 20 kV, 
and the maximum conductor current is fixed at 40 kA. 
Since the quench protection circuit is the most critical part of the TF power supply 
system different designs are under discussion. All schemes are based on a series-
alternating connection of coils and circuit breakers, however, the kind of dump 
resistor connection is different. For the time being a preference is given to a 
circuit scheme as illustrated in Fig. 4. Here the mid points of the magnet dump 
resistors (R 1-R32) are connected by additional resistors (R33-R48) to the common 
bus bar. 
The power supply of the superconducting PF coils is even more complex than for 
the TF coils. This is true because either each coil or each up-down coil pair requires 
an individual supply. Furthermore, the power transfer rate can be quite large 
during a pulse scenario. A reference burn cycle during pulsed operation is about 
400 s. The necessary power depends furthermore on the power supply Iayout and 
on the need for sweeping of the separatrix in the divertors. 
The power supply of the TF coils is about 50 MW. For the PF coils it is determined 
by the interaction with the plasma including both delivering and absorbing 
power. The maximum net inputpower from the supply system is below 400 MW. 
The negative net power amounts to about 450 MW. Here energy is feeded to the 
grid. 
The design conditions and criteria for the power supply and protection systems 
are described in detail in [1, 2]. However, there are some open questions in the 
overall specification and concerning special components. 
Concerning faults it seems that control malfunction is the most severe fault of the 
PF coil power supply. Switching malfunction is considered to be the most severe 
fault for the TF coil power supply. For both coil systems the consequences in 
terms of electric, thermal and mechanical impacts will require more 
12 
investigations when the design of the power supply and protection systems is 
known in more detail. 
2.2.6 Auxiliaries and Diagnostics 
Auxiliaries include especially coolant subsystems of the magnet system others 
than liquid helium, and corresponding coil services. They arenot considered here. 
Some attention, however, is directed to the diagnostics. 
Both TF and PF coils need subsystems for maintaining the control & drive 
functions and for protection of the magnet system, as already mentioned in 
chapter 2.2.5. 
The different diagnostic subsystems of the magnet system perform two primary 
functions: 
they provide control systems which guarantee the orderly and safe startup, 
operation and shutdown of the magnet system, and 
they provide instruments to acquire the experimental and operational data 
for the different test programs. 
According to the safety standards, e.g. as they arevalid in the light water reactor 
technology in Germany, a complete separation of the control system for normal 
and transient operation and for the magnet protection should be achieved. That 
means, two independent systems where the safety system has priority over the 
operation control system. The safety system has to guarantee that the magnet 
systems du ring failures and disturbances but also in the case of accidents could be 
brought back into a safe state. 
The main diagnostic devices are necessary for measuring coil parameters like 
temperature, coolant mass flow, coolant pressure, current, voltage, strains, 
magnetic field and flux changes, possibly acoustic emission, and events like 
quench and short circuits. 
The main purpose of the protection Subsystem is to minimize the consequences of 
any kind of failures originating from the magnet system. This includes 
consequences, both for the magnet and the whole plant. Hence the following 
parameters aretobe limited: 
Temperature rise in the coils 
Mechanical overloads on the coils and structures 
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Overpressure in the cryostat 
Propagation of accidents, such as fire, mechanical damage, etc. 
Quantity of radioactive releases. 
Since the instrumentation for the magnet system is not yet specified a more gene-
ral information is given in the following. 
Du ring installation of the instrumentation, attention has tobe paid to the electri-
cal insulation between winding and instrumentation. Experiences from the LCT 
project Iead to the recommendation to avoid, if possible, sensors within the 
windings. Feedthrough techniques are needed for routing the instrumentation 
wires out of the coil to avoid leaks from helium to tank vacuum. 
Coil instrumentation includes sensors, cabling from the sensors to the control 
room, and signal conditioning units. Some of these units are equipped with local 
displays, some with output to the data acquisition system for display and storage, 
and some with output to the coil protection system to provide automatic dum-
ping action. 
Concerning reliability and availability of the magnet system it is stressed again 
that especially the instrumentation devices yield a high and sensitive contribu-
tion. This is underlined also by a study on the reliability and availability of 
protection, instrumentation and control installations for the TF and the PF coils 
[7]. There is a Iot of information on types and numbers of appropriate instrumen-
tation including recommendations on redundant arrangements of different de-
vJces. 
A direct link between the plasma conditions and various sub-systems is provided 
by the pulse termination network. lt receives signals from the plasma position, 
the current control, and the plasma fault protection systems. The latter system 
has to detect disruptions and to provide backup protection for feedback of plas-
ma current and density. 
The need for a reliable and efficient plasma control will be one of the most im-
portant issues especially with regard to reduce the number of plasma disruptions. 
These can result from unsuitable plasma control. Even when a thermal disruption 
has occurred, it is necessary to control the plasma position and to reduce the 
current decay rate. 
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3. Possible Magnet Failure Events 
3.1 Magnet Failure 
As already mentioned above, the safe and reliable operation of the 
superconducting magnets is considered to be a considerable challenge for the 
design of a fusion machine. Therefore, it is important to consider magnet failures 
occurred in the past, and to use this experience in the design and system analysis. 
As an interesting example the failure in a coil of TORE SUPRA as reported in [8] 
should be mentioned. Due to the unexplained presence of a metal particle a short 
circuit between two pancakes occured. Previous and present engineering 
probiems in magnet technology have been collected by D.B. Montgomery [9], 
taking into account other pertinent reports. The conclusions of these 
investigations -literally cited- are: 
"(1) Failures are more commonly associated with insulation than with the 
conductors. (2) Failures are almost as likely to occur in the Ieads as they are in the 
coils, probably because these details recieve minimal attention. (3) The causes of 
failure in the data base were classified as associated with specific design errors or 
oversights (unanticipated conditions) in two thirds of the entries." 
A very recent review of magnet operating experience has been performed by L.C. 
Cadwallader [10]. The summary of failure events is broken down by initiating 
event categories. The document is supplemented by particular items of order-of-
magnitude of failure rates. These failure rates were derived mainly from 
industrial experience with similar components. 
ln the Iiterature various safety related considerations on s/c magnets are 
discussed as for example referred to in [11 ~ 17]. The most recent report on ITER 
safety [18] will be adressed later on. 
The previous assessments indicate that the fundamental questions for the safety 
of s/c magnets are the following: 
Does the relatively large amount of stored energies within the s/c magnets jeo-
pardize the safe operation of the magnet system in the case of an uncontrolled 
release? Are there initiators and subsequently sequences of events which might 
Iead to deformations or destructions of a magnet and in consequence to 
destructions of structures confining radioactivity? 
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The high amounts of stored energy are due to the required high magnetic field 
and its large volume. lt Ieads to high inductances and operating currents. 
Disturbances in the magnets as a quench, a short or an arc may Iead to heat 
production in the coil windings or to strong nonsymmetrical electromagnetic 
forces or to pressure rise in helium-filled conductors/containers or to a 
combination thereof. After detection of the disturbance the energy usually is 
distracted from the magnets and dumped in an external resistor. Safety relevant 
events are therefore those where this energy transfer is hindered or even made 
impossible as conceivable for various shorts and arcs arrangements within or 
outside the coils but within the cryostat, or outside the cryostat in the power 
supply/dump circuits. 
Experimental investigations of the relevance of a number of different fault ini-
tiations and consequences in the TESPE experiments at KfK [ 19- 22] and the Large 
Coil Task at Oak Ridge [23] showed the tolerance of the magnet systems with 
respect to loss of flow for more than ten minutes, or to the malfunction of the 
current breakers or quench detectors for a few seconds. The faults of most con-
cern are shorts, arcing inside the coils, arcing across the Ieads and arcing in the 
series current connection between the coils or their power supply. lt is possible to 
operate the magnet set with a shorted coil and not be aware of the fault until the 
system current is changed. Conversely, the presence of an arc or short may require 
that the operator discharge the coil at a slower rate than usual or even to 
suspend the discharge. Hence, it should be investigated if an automatic magnet 
control system will be able to diagnose failures in the magnet system in some 
detail before dissipating the stored energy. 
lt is stressed again that the most severe problern seems to be arcing since the 
significant mechanism for an undesired transfer of the stored energy with 
destructive consequences mainly occur by arcing. Hence, the main objective is to 
avoid or reduce initiating events lea~ing to arcing and to mitigate the conse-
quences. 
A direct result of this is to take special care in the design and manufacturing of 
the s/c magnets. An extremely high standard of quality assurance is a necessary 
basis for a high degree of operational safety, availability and reliability of the 
magnet system as a whole. 
Based on investigations for NET a classification into reference accident sequences 
was performed [24]. This classification gives a coarse envelope to cover the main 
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events and the most important failure modes. They may be grouped according to 
a functional analysis into direct failures and induced failures. 
lf a failure of a system, subsystem or component can directly cause a loss of a pro-
cess function of the system it is called direct failure. lf a failure of a system, sub-
system or component can cause a failure of another system, and thus these failu-
res can indirectly cause a loss of function, it is called induced failure. 
3.2 Definition of Reference Accident Sequences (RAS) 
ln the category of direct failures the following magnet reference accident se-




Uncontrolled growing of anormal conducting zone 
This accident means a normal conducting zone with no recovery. 
The normal conducting zone may be generated by a local heat pro-
duction or an abrupt movement of a winding part. The additional 
assumption isthat the dumping system does not work, so that a so-
called thermal failure propagation will occur. The main focus of 
this accident is whether, and if so, what kind of structural failure 
has to be expected for the coils. lf during the accident a loss of 
coolant sequence is entered the consequences should be covered 
under that accident sequence. lt is assumed that the sequences can 
be superimposed. 
Low Ohmshortsand arcs on a magnet 
This sequence again has the main focus on structural failure. The 
reasons for such a failure may stem from currents in the magnet 
system different from those assumed for the design; either by a 
low Ohm short or by an arc or an erroneous status of the current 
switches for the PF coils. 
Loss of insulation vacuum (LIVA) 
The loss of the cryostat vacuum boundary, due to causes external to 
the magnet system, is assumed. The initiating event can be a breach 
of the cryostat boundary or a LOCA in a cooling pipe, outside the 
vacuum vessel, follovved by the rupture of the containment pipe, 
which is assumed to surreund all the pipes within the cryostat. 
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RAS-1d: 
The main focus of this sequence is to evaluate the consequences on 
the overall system due to the global heat-up ramp for the coil 
systems. This, in fact, could make the pressure transient in the 
cryostat worse than that being studied in RAS-1d. 
Loss of cooling for the coils (LOCA) 
A LOCA may arise following a break of a manifold or a pipe due to 
mechanical reasons or following to a break of a coil due to 
extended arcing. The heliumlost in the cryostat is heated up by the 
stored magnetic energy through the structural masses or by the arc. 
The main focus of this accident is to study the pressure transient in 
the cryostat. 
Another sequence in the category of direct failures is the spontaneaus rupture 
of a coil due to crack growth. ln [42] it was assumed that coil case and winding 
pack fail simultaneously, in [43] only a failure of the coil case or parts of it is 
assumed. Depending on the design of the coil case this sequence has to be 
reconsidered. 
Concerning the induced failures the following magnet reference accident se-
quences should be taken into account. Two kinds of induced failures are 
considered: failures the origin of which lies in others than the magnet systems, 
and failures correlated with plant external events. 
RAS-1e: Fire 
A fire may occur within the cryostat, outside of the cryostat or in 
the vacuum vessel. ln the first case a failure of the cryostat, 
burnable materials like cable insulation and an igniting tempera-
ture, e.g. an arc, are required. The amount of stored energy and 
the number of necessary conditions show that this event is unlikely. 
ln the second case current and coolant lines as weil as dump 
resistors may loose their function for the magnet system. More 
detailed design is required to see how such events can proceed. The 
third case follows from a severe accident in the vacuum vessel, e.g. 
a graphite fire where local heat Ioads could occur at the magnets. 
The main safety demand for the design of the magnet systems is a 
safe shut-down and maintaining the magnet systems (and the 
plant) in a safe condition. Furthermore, it should be ensured, that 





dioactive or toxic material remains within prescribed Iimits du ring 
and after any fault condition. 
Loss of off-site power 
Loss of off-site power is an event which may result as a secondary 
effect from man-induced hazards like human intervention, or from 
natural-induced hazards like seismic events or lightning stroke. 
lnitiating events should be considered to occur not only outside but 
also inside the plant. 
ln case of a loss of off-site power the rnain safety demands on the 
plasma and the magnets are first a safe shut-down of the plasma 
burning process, and second a safe discharge of the PF magnets. 
Earthquake 
To minimize the earthquake Ioads on the coils the support 
structures of the magnet system have to be designed properly. The 
general aim of protection of the magnet systems against 
earthquakes is to provide means to safely shutdown the magnets 
and to maintain them in a safe condition. 
For the magnet systems the following items are of special concern: 
- The discharge system, 
- the design of the legs of the TF coils to avoid interactions 
between the magnets and the vacuum vessel insmall gaps, 
- the design of current Ieads and coolant lines. 
The seismic hazard depends strongly on the geographical location. 
For example in Europe the earthquake map shows high and 
medium seismic activities in the south and low seismic activities in 
the north. A strong site dependence also exists for the response 
spectrum of the ground. 
Drop of a heavy Ioad 
A typical heavy Ioad that could drop on the magnet system is a 
blanket segment while it is exchanged. This can happen only du ring 
maintenance when the plant is shut down. The component that 
will be affected most by such an event is the cryostat. Other 




magnets. For a more detailed design it has to be checked which 
Ioad could cause such an event. However, no release of 
radioactivity has tobe anticipated. 
Design measures as redundant cables on cranes or interlocks for the 
handling units should be used to adequately reduce the failure 
probability. 
Local external heat input to a coil 
This accident has its focus on the upper connection box, where the 
supply lines for the blanket segments run nearby the TF coils. lf it is 
assumed that a loss of coolant accident in the blanket cooling 
system occurs in this box, it wili be heated up to coolant 
temperature. The question is whether the structure can withstand 
the hydrostatic Ioad of the coolant or whether it fails. Another 
question is whether the magnet insulation will fail and the vacuum 
is lost (RAS-1c). ln both cases additional heat Ioads are exerted on 
the coils. 
The heatup ramp for the coils as a function of the events indicated 
has to be determined and compared with ramps due to other 
events with similar consequences, like the loss of insulation vacuum 
(LI VA) 
Magnet field induced missiles 
An accident may also be caused by loose parts, such as tools, 
accelerated by the magnetic field. ln the worst case it might be 
assumed that these parts which act as a missile breach the cryostat. 
The loss of vacuum would then Iead to a magnet quench with the 
consequence of a plasma disruption. 
To avoid such missiles the presence of loose parts, i. e. tools or 
components, in the cryostat has tobe excluded by engineering and 
administrative measures during the design, construction and 
maintenance. 
For the induced failures RAS-1 e, RAS-1f and -1 i it is assumed that they don't ini-
tiate new accident sequences. They rather will amplify the probability of one of 
the sequences mentioned before. RAS-1g and RAS-1h are assumed tobe covered 
by design. 
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This study will focus on the assessment of the direct failures listed above and their 
consequences. 
The actual state of the ITER magnet safety analysis as a result of the conceptual 
design phase is reported in [18]. lt seems worthwhile to cite literally what ITER 
safety people have summarized on the magnets: 
"The magnet system does not contain significant radioactivity 
inventories but the large energy inventory is a potential accident 
initiator. ln theory without good design, magnets could release 
energy in such a way to darnage the vacuum chamber, coolant lines, or 
fail confinement barriers. Safety assessments of the ITER magnet 
system suggest that this is not possible. The key issue for detailed 
engineering and analysis is to insure that movement of inboard coil 
legs is not possib!e in transients with unbalanced currents and forces." 
Taking into account this statement and the considerations mentioned above the 
main problems arise from those events in an accident sequence having the 
potential to the release of radioactivity into the environment. 
Hence, magnet safety should focus on the analysis of reference accident 
sequences including events which have a potential to propagate from the 
magnet system to adjacent components. As a basic design requirement of the 
NET/ITER magnet system it was assumed by the ITER magnet designersthat any 
fault and related darnage should be confined within the magnet system without 
jeopardizing adjacent components. This means that the magnet system itself acts 
as the first barrier. The assessment of the extent to which this requirement can be 
fulfilled should be a major objective. Otherwise, the integrity of further barriers 
against the release of radioactivity has to be addressed. A conceivable failure 
propagation process is illustrated schematically in Fig. 5. Radioactivity release to 
the environment is only possible if the last confinement barrier would fail. 
ln this sense, especially the following events are considered to have a potential of 
failure propagation. Essentially, these events are considered to be critical ones 
also by other safety experts [25]. 
(1) Uncontrolled growing of anormal conducting zone 
with the main question of the maximum coil temperature reached 
(2) lnfluence of shorts and arcs on the coil behaviour with the two areas: 
- Electric arc outside a coil 
with the main question of the affected environment 
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- Electric arc inside a coil 
with the response of the coil to the mechanical and thermal Ioads 
(3) Coil deformation or displacement 
due to exceptional electro-mangnetic orthermal Ioads 
(4) Volume change of cryogenic helium 
due to a loss of coolant accident with helium expulsion into the 
cryostat, or initiated by a loss of insulation vacuum. 
ln the following chapter these events are dealed with in a more detailed manner. 
The influence of shorts and arcs on the coil behaviour is illustrated in this report 
with regard to the toroidal field coils_ The main objective is to demonstrate 
whether an aceidentat sequence of events may be stopped in an early phase. This 
would mean that severe magnet failures will not propagate to an extent that 
results in jeopardizing adjacent components and finally the environment of a 
fusion plant. 
With regard to the present knowledge on magnet safety and the status of the 
development of the design the extent of the safety analysis is limited. Therefore, 
this report is considered to be of preliminary character with the necessity of a 
stepwise iteration of the safety analysis in parallel with the evolving design. 
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4. Assessment of Critical Events 
4.1 Uncontrolled Growing of a Normal Conducting Zone 
A preliminary investigation on the consequences of an uncontrolled growing 
normal conducting zone with the code system MAGS [26] indicates that an 
unclasp of a coil is not to be expected [27]. The prerequisite for such a failure 
would be a local heat up of a coil cross section so that mechanical failure due to 
the combined mechanical and thermal Ioad would occur. The temperature 
distribution found so far shows no localized heat production in the coil. Due to 
the winding technique and the flow of the hot helium there are alternating 
hotter and colder channels. The hot zones primarily propagatein circumferential 
direction, as can be seen in Fig. 6 showing the coolant temperatures of a TF 
pancake 7.5 seconds after a spurious local quench. 
The average quench velocity is difficult to estimate because it is strongly varying. 
Main parameters are the intensity of the magnet field and the current density. lf 
the average is taken over several seconds the quench velocity in a pancake is 
about 50 m/s. 
Temperatures in the cable space are growing with 70 K/s and 100 K/s for 
operational current and 150 % current, respectively. The cable jacket tem-
peratures follow with some delay. ln a rough estimate the jacket temperature is 
found to be roughly 60% of the cable temperature for the transients considered 
here. The insulation temperatures Iack even more. They are in the order of 20 % 
to 30 % of the cable temperature. 
The pressure in the cable can easily grow beyond the design pressure of the cable 
(greater 200 bar). 
The behavior of the iniet manifold seems to be very important. lt promotes 
propagation of a normal conducting zone because hot helium from one pancake 
can be pressed into all other pancakes (see Fig. 7 and 8). Furthermore, the plenum 
has to withstand the same extreme pressures as the coolant channel if no 
depressurization takes place. 
After a transient time in the order of 10 to 20 seconds also the outlet plenum is 
exposed to high thermal and mechanical Ioad as previously the inlet plenum. 
Then a failure of the bus bar and arcs on them seem to be likely. More detailed 
analysis is necessary to evaluate the consequences. 
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4.2 lnfluence of Shorts and Ares on the Behaviour of the Toroidal Field Coils 
Under normal operation - for both the phase of constant current and the phases 
of charge or discharge - the TF coil circuit exhibits symmetrical current 
distribution. Disturbances of symmetry by inductive coupling with the pulsed 
poloidal coils are not to be expected. Slight differences of the current in the TF 
circuits of NET may be generated by different delays during the opening of 
discharge switches. These differences do not mean a major disturbance of 
symmetry. However, in case of fault operation the current distribution can 
become strongly asymmetric. After an introductory description of the behavior of 
the TF coils under normal conditions, the behaviour of the TF current in case of a 
short-circuit and of arcing is discussed. Here a distinction is made between the 
two-circuit system of NET and the one-circuit system of ITER. The work done at 
KFK/ITP with respect to shorts and arcs in magnet safety is summarized in [28]. 
The question of 'missile generation' has been investigated but it is not discussed 
here in detail. Recent analyses [29] were rendered possible after numerous 
experiments with arcs in magnet systems and appropriate evaluation. The 
present state of discussion can be briefly summarized as follows: ln case the 
missile generation is not excluded by design, the kinetic energy due to the missile 
acceleration in the magnetic field will only be in the same order of magnitude as 
the kinetic energy due to a free fall of the missile. Measures could then be taken 
by design to Iimit the darnage of the 'missile' on the magnet system. Further 
analyses, however, will have tobe performed. Moreover, a different view should 
be taken on the long arc established after the missile has gone. Surrounding 
components may be hit by that arc burning in the current path of the magnet 
system. 
4.2.1 Coil Current for Normal Operation 
Discharge of the magnet system is started by opening of the switches bridging 
the discharge resistances. ln order to avoid high voltages, a partial resistance is 
allocated to each coil. For the calculational model the partial resistances on the 
one hand and the self and mutual inductances on the other hand may be 
considered as a whole. With the assumption of approximately simultaneaus 
opening of all switches the current characteristics is simplified. The dischargetime 
constant T is given by the ratio of the total inductance of the TF circuit and the 
discharge resistance R. The current variation in time shows the well-known 
exponential shape. For equal discharge resistances the transient currents in the 
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ITER and NET circuits, are the same, too. ln case of non-simultaneaus opening of 
the switches differences occur between the two systems. While there is only a 
change of dischargetime constant in case of ITER, different currents will flow in 
the two NET TF circuits. 
For NET additional peculiarities of current distribution may occur due to the 
division into two circuits. lf it is possible to switch both circuits indepently of each 
other, one circuit may be discharged while the other continues to carry the full 
operating current. The two circuits show conductive de-coupling while they are 
strongly coupled by magnetic induction. Current variations in the second circuit 
are generated when the current in the first circuit is changed. While the current 
in the circuit under discharge decreases with the given time constant, the current 
in the second circuit increases up to a maximum value which is described by 
l1,max = lo (1 + M/L1) = lo (1 + kcircuit) 
with L1 = 17.3 H the inductance of one circuit, M = 11.5 H the mutual inductance 
of the circuits and kcircuit the coupling coefficient of the two circuits. 
For NET the complete discharge of the first TF circuit Ieads to an increase of the 
current in the second circuit up to 166 %, i.e. for an operating current of 37.9 kA 
an increase up to 63.1 kA is conceivable if the coil remains superconducting. 
4.2.2 Current Distribution in the TF Coil Circuit in Case of Short 
The analyses presented below were done with the simplifying conservative 
assumption that the heat generated by a short or arc does not induce a quench of 
the superconducting coils. 
A short-circuit bridging e.g. a coil or a pancake, for instance, considerably disturbs 
the symmetric current distribution du ring charging or discharging of the system. 
The induced current in the shorted circuit can grow significantly in systems like 
ITER or NET which have a I arge coupling coefficient between coils. As an example, 
the case of a shorted coil exposed to a fast discharge of the system is calculated. 
The solution allows also the calculation of a shorted pancake, a shorted winding 
or any other shorted partial inductance. 
For the mechanical design of the coil case and the intercoil structure the 
maximum of current increase in the shorted coil is of importance. Therefore the 
present consideration ignores quench due to overriding the critical current of a 
specific superconductor design. Here both the maximum radial force and the 
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maximum lateral force are found acting on the coil and its case. The maximum 
possible current in the shorted coil is calculated for infinite time and for the 
assumption of an ideal short, i.e. Rsh = 0. The discharge of the ITER TF system 
with one shorted coil enhances the current in this coil by a factor of 
(1 + kcoil) = 2.58. Fora complete discharge of the NET system, i.e. simultaneaus 
discharge of both circuits, the current in the shorted coil experiences the same 
increase. Beginning with 37.9 kA the maximum reaches 97.8 kA, if the coil 
remains superconducting. This value should be taken as a basis for the mechanical 
design. 
At the beginning of discharge the short resistance Rsh influences only slightly the 
increase of coil current while it becomes decisive for the rest of the current 
characteristics. Figure 9 clearly shows that short resistances up to 1 mQ still allow 
the induced current to reach nearly the maximum value of 97.8 kA mentioned 
before. After a broad maximum at 40 s the current starts to decrease slowly. With 
increasing short resistance the energy deposition in the short grows. The decay of 
the induced current in the Rsh is accelerated. The pronounced maximum is 
reached at shorter time. For the rather I arge resistance Rsh = 100 mQ a maximum 
current of 52 kA is reached after only 12 s, followed by a fast decrease of the 
current in the shorted circuit. 
4.2.2.1 Peculiarities of the NET Two-Circuit System 
For the two-circuit TF system of NET special behaviour results when for any reason 
only one single circuit is discharged instead of two. ln spite of the short in the first 
circuit the discharge of the undisturbed second circuit Ieads to an equal current 
increase in the first circuit: The currents i 1 (t) and icoil(t) are the same. Und er 
extreme condition (Rsh = 0) they can reach 63.1 kA. The short-circuit has no 
influe,nce on the current distribution if only the undisturbed coil circuit is 
discharged. The current in the short is zero. This behaviour can be explained by 
absolute symmetry and same coupling between the coils. 
However, if the first circuit with the shorted coil is discharged, the current 
decrease in the remaining 7 coil circuit Ieads to a current enhancement in the 
second circuit by 58% up to nearly 60 kA. The current in the shorted coil icoil(t) is 
slightly decreased down to 34 kA. This behaviour is explained by two 
counteracting tendencies: A decrease of i1(t) in the first circuit is followed by an 
increase of icoil(t), while the simultaneaus increase of current in the second circuit 
reduces icoil(t). 
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4.2.3 Determination of the Are Valtages for NET/ITER 
Transfer of the experimental results obtained at TESPE to NET and ITER is donein 
two ways, first the laws of simil~rity are applied and second a linear 
approximation is performed. Voltages are found between 180 V and 300 V for an 
assumed arc of 20 mm length in a spatially restricted environment, e.g. inside a 
coil. Taking into account the additional influences of a magnetic field and gas 
pressure the voltage rangetobe applied for analyses is enlarged. Fora 20 mm arc 
values between 180 V and 400 V can be used with sufficient confidence for 
calculations of current and force distribution. 
ln addition, it can be shown that also the voltage of a free burning arc outside a 
coil will have a rather limited range. For calculations of current distributions in 
NET/ITER with a system current near 40 kA arc voltages between 150 V and 300 V 
may be used for a free burning arc of 20 mm length. 
For the higher voltage Ieveis the voltage is roughly proportional to the arc 
length. 
4.2.4 Current Distribution in the TF Coil Circuit with an Are across one Coil 
An arc across the terminals of one coil may be ignited e.g. by an electrical 
breakdown or after burnout of a short-circuit during a system discharge. The 
voltage between windings, for the "one-in-hand" winding technique applied, 
du ring a fast discharge is not higher than 50 V and is not sufficient for an 
electrical breakdown. Here arcs might only occur through disconnection of shorts. 
Application of the "two-in-hand" winding technique for NET produces much 
higher voltages between neighbouring windings of 900- 1000 V. This value may 
be high enough forabreakdown in case of local faults of the insulation. 
For the following discussions it is assumed that the arc is ignited across a complete 
coil immediately after beginning of discharge, further that the arc voltage 
reaches its final value at once and is constant for the burning period. 
Figure 10 shows the current characteristics forafast discharge of ITER and the 
total NET TF coil system, resp., when an arc burns across one coil. The calculation 
is performed for voltages between 150 V and 400 V. The time dependence of the 
arc current is described by 
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ln contrast to the case of short-circuit coil current icoil(t) and arc current iarc(t) 
decrease linearly beyond the maximum. For an arc voltage of 200 V the following 
data are calculated: The arc current re~ches 91 kA, which is close to the maximum 
value for an ideal short-circuit. The following decrease of icoil(t) and iardt) has the 
velocity of 143 A/s. The total arc burning period is 684 s. Within this period 
roughly 6.5 GJ of the stored energy are converted in the arc. lncreasing voltage 
Ieads to a reduction of burn time but also to burning at higher power Ievei. lt can 
be shown, however, that the converted energy is approximately independent of 
the arc voltage. Remaining uncertainties of the arc voltage are, therefore, not 
significant. 
4.2.4.1 NET Peculiarities 
Regarding the current distribution in the TF coil circuits of NET with one arcing 
coil and the discharge of one circuit only, the obtained characteristics are similar 
to the case of a short. Du ring discharge of the undisturbed circuit a short-circuit 
over any inductance cannot burn out and produce an arc because of the short 
current being zero (cf. 4.2.2.1). ln case of discharge of the disturbed circuit with 
one shorted coil an induced current flows through the short or through the later 
arc. An increase of the coil current is not observed. Nevertheless, the arc current 
can reach a maximum of 34 kA. The arc energy again is approximately 
independent of the arc voltage and is calculated with 830 MJ. 
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4.2.5 Current Distribution in NET/ITER TF with an Are in Series to the Current Path 
Break of a current carrying conductor in an inductive system always Ieads to an 
electric breakdown. For sufficiently high energy stored and a sufficiently high 
current this electric gas discharge Ieads to the development of an arc where at 
leastapart of the stored energy is converted to heat. 
Melting or mechanical break of the superconductor inside a TF coil or of a current 
Iead or of a current bus is inevitably followed by ignition of an arc. Without any 
action the cornplete TF circuit of ITER would be discharged by an arc (roughly 
40 GJ). This case has the highest destructive potential for the TF systern of ITER. 
The current reduction rate is determined by the ratio of arc valtage and the 
inductance of the circuit. For an arc valtage of e.g. 300 V the current is reduced by 
5.2 A/s. 
A rnitigating rneasure is here the fast discharge of the total TF systern. lt reduces 
the convertable energy in the arc. The current characteristics then hardly differ 
frorn the regular fast discharge as the arc valtage is small cornpared to the 
discharge voltage. The convertable energy is approximately proportional to the 
arc valtage e.g. 106 MJ for 200 V and 212 MJ for 400 V. 
Deviations frorn the discussed current characteristics result for the case of an arc 
burning inside the coil after break of the conductor because the local heat 
production will induce a quench. The corresponding increase of the ohrnie 
resistance in the circuit absorbs part of the energy and this reduces the arc 
energy. Therefore a fast quench propagation and a quick increase of ohrnie 
resistance is highly desirable. 
4.2.5.1 NET Peculiarities 
ln case an arc in the current path would rernain undiscovered in NET, only the 
disturbed circuit discharges while the current in the secend circuit is enhanced. 
For constant arc valtage the current change would be linear in both circuits. For 
an arc burning with 300 V the current in the disturbed circuit is reduced by 
31.2 A/s. Here the current change is determined by the ratio of arc valtage and 
the effective inductivity for one-circuit-discharge. The current in the second 
circuit increases by 20.6 A/s up to its rnaximurn value of 63.1 kA. The energy 
converted in the arc arnounts to 6.9 GJ and is independent of the arc valtage but 
depends on the effective inductivity and the related stored energy. For this 
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discharge case the effective inductivity is calculated as 9.6 H, which corresponds 
to a stored energy of 6.9 GJ. 
The properties of the chosen superconductor can also cause changes of the 
current characteristics. lf the current in the undisturbed second circuit reaches its 
critical value the conductor quenches. The increasing ohrnie resistance in the coil 
Ieads then to a discharge of the second circuit which in turn couples energy back 
to the first circuit where the arc current and the arc energy can increase. Forthis 
case it is desirable to design the superconductor to take the full induced current 
without quench. Otherwise the quench propagation should produce only low 
ohrnie resistance which, however, would be in contradiction to the afore-
rnentioned (4.2.5) requirernents. 
The possibility to discharge the two circuits independently of each other can Iead 
to a reduction of the arc energy in cornparison with the case of cornrnon 
discharge (cf. e.g. 4.2.4.1 and 4.2.4; 4.2.5.1 and 4.2.5). However, also the contrary 
becornes true when in case of an arc in the current path the disturbed circuit is 
not discharged while the undisturbed is. This represents the case of highest 
destructive potential in the TF systern because additional energy is coupled frorn 
the second circuit to the disturbed first circuit. Independent of the arc voltage the 
arc energy can reach 34.5 GJ, i.e. about 84% of the total energy stored in the TF 
systern. Therefore, especially this case has tobe avoided by any rneans. 
4.2.6 Examples of Possible Behaviour of an Are in the TF System 
Exarnples of possible behaviour of an arc and its consequences for the NET/ITER 
TF coil systern are discussed in the following. A short-circuit inside a coilleading to 
ignition of an arc during discharge is a fault which rather frequently occurs, see 
also [9]. The latest report on such a fault is given for TORE SUPRA [8]. Break or 
rnelting of a current Iead or of a current bus between coils followed by an arc in 
the current path cannot be strictly excluded. For instance, it is shown here that 
this case can be a final consequence of a first arc ignited after burn-out of a short. 
Finally, arcing after electrical flashover or breakdown at current carrying parts 
during a fast discharge is reported to have occurred during coil tests of the T-15 
tokarnak [30]. 
4.2.6.1 Development of an Are Inside a Coil after Burn•Out of a Short 
lt is assurned that a rnetal chip is included e.g. in the turn-to-turn insulation 
during winding. The rnagnetic forces acting under operational conditions may 
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cause the chip to pierce through the insulation producing a short-circuit. For two-
in-hand wound coils this means a short between two halves of a double-pancake. 
Further it is assumed that this short is not detected during the constant current 
operation period of the TF system, but it becomes effective du ring a regular (fast) 
discharge caused by operational requirements. A current is induced in the shorted 
circuit. Reaching the melting point of the chip the current in the short may attain 
several 100 A corresponding to a considerable amount of coupled energy. 
Disconnection of the current path in the short-circuit by melting will Iead to an 
interruption of current flow. However, the originally shorted inductance with the 
coupled-in energy then supplies as high voltages as necessary to ensure current 
flow by ignition of an arc. Strong coupling into the arcing circuit further enlarges 
that current. The burn time and the arc energy depend on the arc voltage and on 
the quench propagation. A short arc of only 1 mm length can burn up to 80s with 
a mean voltage between 60 V and 100 V. The arc current can rise depending on 
the winding ratio of pancake and coil by at least a factor of 10, and a total energy 
up to 1 GJ may be converted to heat. Taking into account the high current and 
therefore a higher voltage of e.g. 200 V and, in addition, assuming fast quench 
propagation, then the burn time is reduced to a few seconds. Nevertheless, the 
steel casing of the conductor and the conductor itself will be heavily damaged by 
the arc acting like a plasma burner. The converted energy still is sufficiently high 
to melt and evaporate several centimeters of conductor. Complete local melting 
of the conductor Ieads to ignition of a new arc, this time in the current path, 
which represents the case with the highest destructive potential (cf. 4.2.5). 
Attempts to avoid ignition of an arc after burn-out of a short by reduction of the 
system's discharge voltage were not successful. As shown by experiments there 
does not exist a discharge voltage Iimit below which arcs could be avoided [31 ]. 
4.2.6.2 Are Foliowing a Voltage Breakdown Outside a Coil 
The discharge of the TF coils is connected with high voltages of e.g. 20 kV at the 
current terminals of a coil. The electrical insulation is given by organic insulator 
plus the isolation vacuum. The conceivable darnage of the insulator and the 
possible loss of vacuum drastically reduce the electric strength. Local 
deterioration of the vacuum can e.g. occur near current Ieads due to leaking 
coolant supply terminals. Therefore, the high voltage can Iead to an electric 
breakdown and finally to the ignition of arcs. 
The arc can be ignited e.g. between two current Ieads of a coil. The free burning 
arc outside the coils has a rather low voltage (Varc < 300 V), compared to the 
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system discharge voltage, and initially behaves like a short-circuit, i.e. the coil 
current increases, and energy is coupled into the coil. Maximum energy 
convertable in the arc is here 6.7 GJ. A part of the energy will be transferred to 
the increasing ohrnie resistance generated by quench propagation. Nevertheless, 
the energy of the electrode spots of the arc, heating directly the material, 
amounts to 300 MJ to 500 MJ. Therefore, complete melting of the Ieads and 
separation of the coil from the remaining circuit is conceivable. 
lt is also possible that an arc is ignited and burning free between a Iead and 
neighbouring reactor components which are usually at ground potential. The arc 
moves on its electrodes and can also jump to sharp edges to be localized there. lf 
highly sensible components like control Ieads or even tritium or other 
radioactivity containing pipes are located near the arc, then thermal darnage or 
destruction cannot be excluded. Therefore complete electrical insulation of these 
components is recommended. 
ln addition to the thermal effects of the arcs concerning the electrical circuitry 
conceivable cases have to be examined for mechanical consequences due to off 
normal loadings produced by non-regular, asymmetric current distributions and 
local weakening of the supporting structure due to thermalloading. 
4.3 Coil Deformation or Displacement 
ln this section the mechanical consequences of electrical faults in the magnet 
system are described. Final aim is to quantify safety relevant large coil 
deformations or displacements or loss of integrity of parts of the coils or the coil 
supporting structures. This investigation should be performed in the near future 
dependent on the progress of the design. 
The first step of the work done under this title was to find out those electrical 
faults which will yield the highest mechanical consequences for the magnet 
structure. To do such investigations first the transient currents initiated by the 
assumed faults have to be calculated for the magnetically coupled circuits. This is 
done using the code MSCAP [32]. After that the resulting forces on the coils due 
to currents in the magnetic field are determined using the code EFFI [33] which 
also serves to determine the magnetic fields and inductivity coefficients needed 
for MSCAP. Then, given the loading, the mechanical response of the structure of 
the magnets is evaluated using simple mechanical models. The results of these 
scoping calculating sometimes are confirmed by more detailed calculations 
applying the FEM-eode ABAQUS [34]. 
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ln Fig. 11 the electrical and mechanical interactions of faults in different parts of 
the TF-coils and the PF-coils are summarized. Electrical faults in the TF coil system 
(e.g. a short of a TF coil) will strongly influence the current distribution in the TF 
coil circuit by electrical inductance and consequently the magnetic forces will 
change the loading conditions of the TF coil casing. 
ln a similar way faults in the PF-coil circuits strongly influence the currents of all 
PF-coil circuits and the magnetic force loading of the PF-coils. 
But while (perfect geometry supposed) the electrical circuitry of the PF coils will 
not be influenced by faults in the TF circuits, the magnetic forces influence also 
the mechanics of the PF coils. The same is true considering faults in the PF 
circuitry. Thus, the mechanical consequences due to an electrical fault in one part 
of the system spread over all components. ln reality this effect is even stronger, 
since TF coils and PF coils are partly coupled mechanically. 
ln Tab. 4-1 the characteristics of the mechanical consequences of faults in the 
magnet system are summarized. A fault in a TF coil circuit Ieads to additional 
inplane (ip) and out-of-plane (op) forces of the TF coils and furtheran will 
produce an op moment loading for the PF coils. (Under normal Ioad conditions 
such moments do not occur.) Faults in a PF coil circuit will change the op and ip 
forces of the PF coils and, in addition, will give further op moments for the TF 
coils. As mentioned above, perfect geometry is assumed in our linear analysis. 
lmperfections Iead to inductive coupling of all circuits and may also Iead to 
stability effects which have tobe analysed by nonlinear calculations. This may be 
the subject of future work. 
ln the following the results gained so far will be reported according to the paths 
described above: 
electrical faults in the TF-coils, mechanical consequences in the TF-coil 
structure, 
the same for the PF-coils, 
electrical faults in the TF-coils, mechanical consequences in the PF-coils, and 
vice versa. 
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Table 4-1: Characteristics of the Mechanical Consequences of 
Faults in the Magnet System 
Mech. Loading due to Electrical Faults on 
Location of Failure 
TF Coil Casing PFCoil 
TF Coils additional op*forces op moment 
and ip**forces 






4.3.1 Mechanical Consequences of Faults in the Toroidal Field Coils on its Coil 
Casings 
The investigation of faults in the TF coil system reported in [24, 35, 36] Iead to the 
result that a low ohrnie short at a coil terminal will produce loadings for which 
the mechanical integrity of the central vault probably cannot be maintained. A 
similar conclusion can be found in [18]. 
ln the past [35] different cases leading to non-homogenious loadings have been 
investigated. Some of those loading cases were due to the former NET-concept 
where the TF-coils did belong to two separate current circuits instead of one 
circuit as planned in the ITER concept. This change in design did reduce the 
number of fault seenarios and consequently the number of nonuniform Ioad 
distributions. But the worst case, a low ohmic short circuit at the terminal of a TF-
coil, still remains. 
A further fault case, called open circuit mode, has been treated in [1] . Due to a 
quench in a coil and a subsequent arc or short at its terminal one coil is discharged 
while its neighbours have increased currents due to mutual inductance coupling. 
According to [1] the consequences concerning the centrat vault are comparable to 
the case of a short circuit. 
The structural integrity of the TF coil system is dominated by the behaviour of the 
central vault composed by the wedge-shaped inboard legs of the TF coil casings. 
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Under operational conditions the centering forces of the coils wedge the inner 
legs tagether allowing for shear force loading due to friction between the 
insulated coil-coil interfaces. 
At nominal loading the central vault is under a high rotationally symmetric 
compressive loading. ln this case a vault is an optimum load-bearing structural 
component. 
But faults in some coils will destroy this symmetry and as a consequence 
additional bending momentswill have tobe reacted by the vault. The interfaces 
are weak points from which the failure of the vault is inititated. Therefore the 
crucial details in estimating the Ioad carrying capacity of the vault are the 
interfaces and not a very detailed stress distribution along the vauit segments. 
ln the above mentioned calculations the force and stress distributions have been 
estimated by a simple ring model. Of most importance were the following failure 
criteria, which take into account not only the properties of the particular coil 
casings but also the nonlinear effects due to the interfaces between the coillegs: 
1. Everywhere the stress G must be lower than the yield stress Gy or at least the 
ultimate tensile stress Gurs 
G < Gy or G < Gurs 
2. At all interfaces the normal stress Gt must not be positive otherwise gaps 
would open up and failure due to instability would occur 
Gt < 0 
3. At all interfaces the compressive hoop force Fh must allow for carrying the 
radial shear force Fs by friction 
Fs < p Fh (p = friction coefficient at the interfaces). 
lndeed the above stated failure is not initiated due to violation of criterion ® 
limiting excessive stresses, but due to the violation of criterion ® or ® which may 
occur even at low stress Ieveis. 
lt might be argued that the shear keys at both ends of the - 15 m long central 
vault, which are designed to react the torsional loading of the vault due to the 
out-of-plance forces of the TF-coils, may also react the afore mentioned bending 
moments due to asymmetric fault loading of the vault. But the distance to the 
equatorial plane is too long as to prevent a failure initiation. However, it might 
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be possible, that the shear keys can prevent a global failure of the whole coil 
assembly. 
Concerning the safety considerations the type of failure mechanism is of some 
importance. As mentioned above a failure due to violation of criterion ® (gap 
opening) is a so-calted unstable or catastrophic failure mechanism which has a 
potential to propagate suddenly into neighbouring components. This behaviour 
has been confirmed considering the vault under outer pressure as a nonlinear 
buckling problern [36]. Due to additional axial loadings the postbuckling 
behaviour of the vault modelled as a cylinder is stable. But if the interfaces are 
taken into account the vault is ofthe masonry arch type. Treating this problern by 
a nonlinear theory [36] the post-buckling behaviour changes to an unstable type. 
Furthermore it could be shown, that due to the interfaces a significant imper-
fection sensitivity is introduced. This means that imperfections due to geometry 
or loading (some fault loadings can be considered as Ioad imperfections) reduce 
the critical buckling Ioad, calculated without imperfections, considerably. 
Because of the unstable failure behaviour it has been proposed to introduce an 
additonal locking along the whole coil legs [35, 36]. Otherwise experiments 
studying the nonlinear effects due to the gap behaviour, which have been 
proposed in [36] too, would be necessary. 
4.3.2 Mechanical Consequences of Faults in the Poloidal Field Coils on its Coil 
Structures 
Details of the results reported und er this heading can be found in [37]. 
The fault scenario established for the PF coil system contains shorts in a single coil 
or a pair of coils and full voltage at the power supply of each of the seven PF-coil 
circuits. Due to the transient current program and the seven independent PF-coil 
circuits a great number of faultsandfault combinations is possible. lf in addition 
unsymmetrical plasma configurations (single null) are taken into account, as 
mentioned in [1], even far more extended fault seenarios are possible. ln the work 
reported here 35 cases have been selected for analysis. 
Some interesting results of the current calculations indicate that especially shorts 
in the solenoid coils Iead to current ramps in the faulted coil or coil circuit and to 
opposing currents in its neighbouring cöils. Similar results have been gained for 
the cases of full voltage. The quench is an important limiting effect in case of high 
currents and magnetic fields. Since the magnetic forces depend on these 
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quantities their reliable determination is important for the subsequent 
calculation of sensible mechanical loadings. The quench analysis used here was 
based on assumptions which probably Iead to pessimistic results concerning the 
consequent forces. 
The Ioads have been calculated for times with maximum currents. ln most cases 
these are the currents where quenching occurs. Due to the proportional depen-
dence of the force on the current and the magnetic field this will usually Iead to 
the maximum Ioads. But cases may exist where current combinations of the coils 
Iead to higher forces due to a high magnetic field and lower currents. ln addition 
the mechanical consequences may strongly depend on special Ioad components 
and also on the Ioad direction. Therefore it should be proven whether Ioad 
combinations with higher mechanical consequences as the chosen cases do exist. 
Depending on the support structures of the PF-coils three sub groups of the coils 
have been investigated: 
a) solenoid stack 
b) divertor coils 
c) outer ring coils. 
a) Solenoidstack 
The solenoid stack consists of eight uniform coils held under precompression by 
tie rods. The stack is supported at the inner legs of the TF-coils in the shear key 
regions. 
Concerning the vertical Ioads 13 cases out of 35 cases treated have been proven 
to be critical. The characteristics of these cases are very high forces directed away 
from the equatorial plane and also very high forces which press the coils 
together. ln addition, the who!e stack may have resulting forces which act on the 
supports at the TF-coils. 
The coil stack under the different loadings has been investigated using a simple 
one-dimensional model which takes into account the precompression of the coil 
stack. The characteristic of this model is, that the system under precompression is 
statically indeterminated. But for some fault loading conditions the pre-
compression is lost and the system changes its mechanical state to become a 
statically determinate one, sometimes with a decoupled subsystem. The physical 
meaning of this nonlinear system behaviour is, that if the precompression has 
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been lost one or more gaps in the coil stack open up forming this new system or 
systems, respectively. 
To evaluate the mechanical consequences of the described coil stack behaviour 
three failure criteria with different consequences have been established: Failure 
occurs if 
(1) Gapsopen up in the coil stacks (i.e. precompression is lost) 
(2) the coil compression surpasses the yield strengthin the coils 
(3) the tensile stresses exceed the yield stress or the ultimate tensile strength in 
the supporting stack structure (tie rods) 
Applying these criteria in 13 cases at least one failure criterion is met. 
ln all of these 13 cases precompression (criterion 1) is lost. The consequences are 
indifferent behaviour of the coils in case of minor horizontal Ioads. A higher 
precompression as used in the tatest ITER-design helps in one case only. ln a 
second case instead of criterion 1 criterion 2 is met. 
Criterion 2 is met in two cases. ln calculating the vertical stress it was assumed 
that only the steel fraction of a coil is load-bearing. The consequences will be 
plastic deformations and possibly a coil failure without greater consequences to 
the surroundings. 
Concerning the failure propagation, criterion 3 is of most importance. ln 4 cases 
the ultimate tensile strength of the tie rods is surpassed and the outward loaded 
coils will be accelerated to move outward unless the support design of the coil 
stack structure will hold the coils together. However a check of the actual 
support design revealed, that the clamping will not react these loadings and 
therefore will not prevent the coil movement. in two additional cases the 
ultimate tensile stress is not surpassed but the yield strength. This means that 
smaller displacements due to plastic deformation will occur such that at least 
precompression at normalloading will be lost. 
Most of the inspected cases have an up down symmetry due to a fault concerning 
both coils of a PF-coil circuit. Butthis symmetry is destroyed for faults concerning 
just one coil. Of course, all PF coils as a whole must stay at equilibrium anytime. 
But the individual coil pairs will have resulting forces which act on the 
supportings at the TF-coil structure. Concerning the solenoid stack this means, 
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that the stack support must react forces which are up to about 20 times the 
gravitational force of the whole solenoid stack. ln the actual design the Ioad-
hearing capacity seems nottobe sufficient and a failure with large displacements 
may occur. Furthermore it is important, that the resulting forces may be directed 
upward or downward according to the location ofthe faulted coil twin. 
So far only the vertical Ioads and their consequences have been considered. The 
high fault currents produce also high radial forces and subsequent high 
tangential stresses in the coils. ln one case the yield stress is surpassed in 
tangential direction in the faulted coil pair. But at the sametime these coils are 
compressed in vertical direction beyond the yield stress. 
Additional stress components due to a torsionai ioading araund the solenoid 
winding pack will enhance the stress Ievei. 
b) Divertor coils 
The divertor coils are attached to the TF-coils at their upper and lower arches. ln 
the actual design the clamping is able to react the vertical Ioads. Justin one case 
the radial Ioad is leading to hoop stresses beyond the yield stress. This will Iead to 
plastic deformations, but only low displacements. 
c) Outer ring coils 
The outer ring coils, consists of two coils of the same diameter coupled by an 
intercoil structure hung up by pins fixed at the outer TF-coillegs. ln two cases the 
hoop stress exceeds clearly the ultimate tensile stress for coil PF6 and PF7, 
respectively. ln one case the coil PF7 is under a compressive hoop stress loading. 
But the buckling of the coil is avoided due to the vertical brackets of the coil 
support structure which act as an elastic foundation for the ring coil. 
The verticalloading can be reacted by the supporting structure and the clamping 
at the TF-coils for all investigated cases. 
A failure of the outer ring coils due to the overstress, discribed above, would Iead 
to bursting of these coils and subsequent large deformations and possible failure 
propagation to components outside the magnet system. 
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Now, having seen some quite severe mechanical consequences it will be 
worthwile to check, whether the severe mechanical consequences obtained 
above can be avoided by design modifications. The catastrophic failures of the 
solenoid stack can be avoided if the cross section of the tie rods is enlarged by a 
factor two. The factor 2.5 could even bring the tension stress below the yield 
stress. ln addition the coil stack support should be slightly reinforced to react 
vertical forces of the coils in some cases. A formlocking between the individual 
coils of the stack would prevent uncontrolled horizontal coil displacements when 
the precompression of the coil stack is lost. The remaining failures occuring at the 
Solenoids would then be of tolerable type. 
As to the severe failures of the outer ring coi!s the load-bearing steel cross section 
has to be enlarged by- 20 % for the PF6 coils and - 60 % for the PF7 coils. Thus 
the catastrophic failures of the PF-coil casings due to faults in the PF-coil circuits 
can be avoided. 
4.3.3 Mechanical Consequences of lnteractions Between Poloidal and Toroidal 
Magnets 
To analyse the mechanical consequences in the TF-coil structure caused by 
electrical faults in the PF-coil circuits and vice versa the same fault seenarios are 
underlaid as used in the previous sections. Details about these investigations can 
be found in [38]. 
a) Mechanical consequences in the TF-coil structure due to faults in the PF-coil 
circuits 
Under normal current distribution in the TF-coils (i.e. each TF-coil has the same 
current) the out-of-plane forces of the TF-coils are produced due to the PF-coil 
current program. Having an up-down anti-symmetric distribution the out-of-
plane forces act as an out-of-plane moment. 
Under PF-fault conditions this is not changed principally, but the forces and the 
moments can be much higher. The force distribution along the perimeter 
depends on the different currents of the PF-circuits. 
Concerning the central vault the out-of-plane moments produce a torsional 
loading, twisting of the vault, which can be considered as a slotted tube. At the 
interfaces of the slots an axial shear stress distribution is produced which must be 
reacted by friction forces and the shear keys at both ends of the vault. 
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Roughevaluationsfora quick overview of all the cases of the fault scenario have 
been done using a simple model considering the vault as a flexibel pipe with stiff 
shear key regions at both ends. 
Under normal Ioads (normal out-of-plane loading due to the nominal current 
program during a burning cycle) the shear stress distribution is relatively low at 
half the tube length and increases at both ends. The hoop stress due to the 
nominal radial TF-coilloading allows for friction locking except at the ends where 
shear keys carry the higher shear loading. 
For several fault cases high shear stresses occur at midlength of the vault, and 
therefore the legs at increasing fault loading suddenly will slip and the shear 
forces will upruptly Ioad the shear keys. Along the interfaces where the slip 
occurs the individual coil legs will be stressed due to increased bowing and 
individual torsion since the torsional stiffness of the vault decreases also upruptly. 
lt remains to prove, if the shear keys can react such a dynamic loading which the 
coil legs undergo. On the other hand the additional locking along the whole 
length of the coillegs proposed in section 4.3.1 would solve this problem, too. 
Considering the upper coil arches between the stiff shear key regions and the 
outer intercoil structures the increased out-of-plane loading due to faults of the 
PF-coil circuits will stress these parts in addition. Now the coil arch can be treated 
as a curved beam which undergoes torsion and bending. Compared to normal 
loading, under fault conditions the Ioads can roughly grow by the factor two at 
maximum. 
The resulting stresses are relatively low for all cases and the peak values of the 
different stresses due to bending, torsion, and shear occur at different locations. 
So far, the details of the coil leg cross section did not have been taken into 
account. 
lf the bolted and welded joints combining the two coil casing halfs are taken into 
account, the shear stresses at the interfaces have to be reacted by the bolts and 
the welding seam. A rough calculation, considering the shear Ioad carrying 
capacity of the bolts, revealed that at the upper arch some bolts are strongly 
loaded even under nominal conditions. They hardly are able to carry the fault 
loading. Therefore, increased out-of-plane displacements which again will Iead to 
an increased out-of-plane loading due to the decreasing distance to the 
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neighbour coil (similar to magnetoelastic buckling) and subsequent nonlinear 
failure cannot be ruled out. 
Therefore this part of the TF-coil casing should be taken into a closer inspection 
to avoid the described instability. 
b) Mechanical consequences in the PF coil structures due to faults in the TF-coil 
circuit 
Faults in the TF-coils Iead to asymmetrical toroidal fields which yield overturning 
moments for the PF-coils areund a line through the faulted TF-coil and the central 
point of the coil assembly and resulting in-plane forces perpenticular to this line. 
Under such loadings the solenoid coil stack undergoes a bowing. But the 
maximum bending stresses are still tolerable. Due to the lateral in-plane forces 
the friction between the piled Solenoids cannot avoid smaller lateral 
displacements limited by the surrounding tie rods. lf this cannot be tolerated a 
geometrical Ieeking between the individual coils, just proposed in the previous 
section treating the PF-fault loadings, should be introduced. 
At last critical point is the supporting of the pair of outer ring coils hung up at the 
outer TF-coillegs. Due to the asymmetrical out-cf-plane loading (which yields the 
overturning moment) the 16 bearing blocks are loaded very unequally. The 
supports sitting on the TF-coils neighbouring the faulted coil have by far the 
highest Ioads. ln one critical case the screws of the mentioned bearing boxes 
would not withstand the Ioads. Therefore the supporting should be reinforced. 
4.4 Volume Change of Cryogenic Helium 
The main focus of the assessment of the consequences of this event is the possible 
pressure impact to radioactivity confining structures, especially the vacuum 
vessel. 
The helium inventory in the coils amounts to about 80m3. The maximum portion 
in one coil is about 8m3, and this applies for PF6. Each TF coil contains about 2m3. 
Additional inventories are present in the supply lines and refrigerating plant. 
Volume changes of cryogenic helium may be initiated mainly by two different 
reference accident sequences as mentioned in chapter 3: Loss of insulation 
vacuum accident (LIVA) and Loss of coil cooling accident (LOCA). 
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A LIVA may be initiated by a breach in the cryostat vacuum boundary or a LOCA in 
a cooling pipe within the cryostat. A LOCA may be initiated by a break of a 
helium line or a leak of a coil due to extended arcing. 
ln both cases the helium expelled from a coil into the cryostat is heated up by the 
Joule effect due to the coil quench, by the structural masses, and by arcing if an 
arc occurs. Both, the fraction of helium inventory that is prone to expulsion and 
the amount of energy that can be transferred to the helium and that influences 
the expulsion dynamics need further investigations. 
lt is assumed in [18] that in the case of a cooling line break helium may be 
expelled into the cryostat. The time of expulsion could approach the time of a coil 
self quench which is about 30 s. The maximum quantity of helium in one coil is 
estimated to pressurize the cryostat with a volume of 6000 m3 to 30 kPa at 300 K. 
This pressure lies far below the design pressure of the cryostat. As a mitigating 
measure bursting disks opening a pressure relief volume could be provided 
additionally. 
ln contrary, other assessments for NET [39, 40] indicate that with certain 
assumptions concerning the amount of expelled helium and the heat inputs to 
the helium both for a LIVA and LOCA accident the overpressure in the cryostat 
could exceed the design Iimit. 
As already mentioned, further investigations of these phenomena will be 
necessary in parallel with the evolving design. 
With regard to the cryogenic system itself a recent review on operating 
experience of cryogenic systems for different applications has been compiled by 
L.C. Cadwallader [41]. ln this report estimates of cryogenic component failure 
rates and accident initiating event frequencies are presented for use in risk 
assessment, reliability, and availability studies. Safety concerns with cryogenic 
systems are discussed in order to identify possible weak points. 
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5. Condusions and Recommendations for Further Analyses 
5.1 ldentification and Analysis of Most lmportant Safety Concerns 
The induced radioactivity in the magnets is small. However, the large amount of 
stored energy within the coils is considered to be a potential hazard by the 
possibility to initiate or enhance magnet failures. A still open question to be 
investigated is whether faults in the magnets may have the consequence that the 
containment function of an adjacent component is lost. Mechanisms that may 
Iead to a failure are mechanical orthermal electrical impacts or a combination of 
both. 
At KfK a wide spectrum of magnet accidents has been investigated theoretically 
and experimentally. A short summary of the results is given here. 
With respect to safety questions comprehensive experimental investigations on 
the TESPE torus and corresponding analyses have been performed in order to 
identify the most relevant faults in TF coil systems. For this part of the safety 
studies it was assumed that a certain failure has happened and its safety conse-
quences were investigated. 
lt could be shown that each of the following single events can be taken without 
safety relevant darnage by the magnet system being appropriately designed: Loss 
of cooling, loss of insulation vacuum and magnetic buckling. Their significance 
grows in case of simultaneaus occurrence of further faults like local darnage of 
electrical insulation outside of the magnets. 
However, there are two major faults which had to be studied in more detail due 
to their safety relevance, namely short-circuits and electrical arcs. Ares may occur 
inside or outside of magnets, they may burn in parallel to an inductance or in 
series. As the environmental conditions (such as magnetic field, various materials 
as heat sinks, melting and evaporation of materials, gas streams, surface 
geometry) have a significant influence on the current-voltage characteristics of 
the arcs, an extensive experimental program was performed. Good 
reproducibility was found when the environmental conditions were kept. 
Depending on the conditions values of the burning voltage were found between 
20 and 200 V at the currents available in the experiment. This reproducible data 
basis can be taken for assessing corresponding values by law of similarity. For 
instance, a 40 kA I 20 mm arc corresponds to a voltage of 100 to 400 V. With these 
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values the current distributions in the system and the energy deposition were 
calculated. 
ln case of of an arc parallel to one coil of the TF system of NET a maximum of 
6.7 GJ may be burned in the arc, if there would be no other mechanism of energy 
distribution like loss of insulation vacuum and quenching. ln order to have an 
idea of the amount of material involved a figure of 3 MJ/kg of winding can be 
used (all material is melted and half of it is evaporated). Again without taking 
into account the energy distribution mechanisms, more than 80% of the total 42 
GJ stored in the NET TF system may be set free in an arc burning in series if the 
unaffected circuit of the two TF circuits can be discharged only. This maximum 
figure reaches 100 % in case of a single coil circuit and malfunction of all dis-
charge circuits. But even in case of a fully working discharge circuit the deposition 
of energy still amounts on several 100 MJ. Practical measures for stopping 
burning of an arc do not exist. These energy values show clearly the significance 
of the electrical arcing in the magnet system. Safety relevance can be seen e.g. 
when a series arc burns to such a length that neighbouring sensitive components 
are closer than the arcs electrodes, or when a gas stream takes the arc to other 
components, or when the magnetic field drives the arc, etc .. 
lt could be shown that the ignition of an arc through burning of a short during 
charge or discharge cannot be avoided by reducing the driving voltage even to an 
arbitrary low value. The arc cannot be stopped and the coupled-in energy cannot 
be extracted. 
While the significance of electrical arcing could be demonstrated it should be also 
made clear that appropriate system design will be capable of handling these 
questions. However, it is necessary to assist the designer by investigating in more 
detail the precursors of the named faults, to find more mitigating measures, and 
have a detailed analysis of the reference accident sequence as proposed. 
The question of missile generation is under investigation. The status of work is 
encouraging as the new results obtained so far Iead to dramatically lower 
conversion of magnetic energy to kinetic energy than assumed till now. 
To analysethermal failure events the modular code system MAGS has been de-
veloped. MAGS has the capability to describe all essential effects of this events, 
i.e. 
- Simulation of coolant plena 
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- Thermohydraulic analysis of the coolant with SARUMAN 
- Thermalanalysis of the so Iids 
- Quench detection and transient quench resistance calculation 
- Current calculated with MSCAP 
- Magnet field calculated with EFFI 
As sample cases a quench evolving at the operational current as weil as the 
quench of a shorted TF coil during the dump of the TF coil system were 
investigated. 
We found: 
- lmportance of local magnet field on quench velocity 
- lmportance of helium plena for quench propagation 
- No local hot spot du ring quench 
Subject of structural analyses was the evaluation of the consequences of faults in 
the electric systems on the magnetic loading and the mechanical response of the 
structures. 
The ITER magnet system consists of two coil subsystems: The TF coils electrically 
connected in one circuit and the PF coils with seven circuits containing a pair of 
coils each. Mechanically the substructures are the 16 TF coils the inner legs of 
them forming the central vault, the central solenoids combined in a coil stack, 
the divertor coils and the outer ring coils. 
According to the different fault locations a systematic study on the spread of the 
mechanical consequences on the subsystems has been performed. Then a fault 
scenario for the different circuits with different fault modes (short circuit, 
erroneous control) has been established containing about 40 fault cases. The 
transient currents of the circuits coupled inductively have been determined and 
the magnetical loadings on the coils have been calculated for all cases. The 
principal mechanical behaviour and the relevant failure mechanisms of the 
complex structures have been evaluated using simple, transparent models. The 
results have been confirmed for critical cases by FEM calculations. 
46 
Several parts have been identified leading to structural failure under fault 
loading conditions. ln terrns of safety analysis there are two failure categories: 
tolerable failure, where the darnage is confined to the rnagnet systern and severe 
failure, typically being of unstable kind and possibly irnpairing neighbouring 
radioactivity confining cornponents. The following critical iterns are of the latter 
type where with the actuel design concept a loss of integrity could be initiated: 
Local instability of the central vault in the equatorial plane under radial 
bending rnornents due to TF coil faults 
Loss of torsion rigidity of the central vault under increased torsional loading 
due to PF coil faults 
Failure of the coil case bolts and subsequent large unstable lateral 
displacernents at the upper TF coil arches due to increased out-of-plane Ioads 
under PF coil faults 
Rupture of the solenoid stack structure caused by strong repelling forces due 
to PF coil faults 
Rupture of outer ring coils und er excessive hoop stresses due to PF coil faults. 
To avoid these failures proposals for an irnproved design have been rnade. The 
failure of the first three iterns does not occur due to excessive stresses in the 
cornponents but is initiated at the interface areas of the cornposed structure. 
Sornetirnes theses interfaces are needed for electrical insulation. The proper 
design of such interface connections is of rnore principal nature and should be 
investigated in parallel to the designers work. 
5.2 Open Questionsand Recommendations for Further Analyses 
As a basic design requirernent of the NET/ITER rnagnet systern it was assurned 
that any fault and related darnage should be confined within the rnagnet systern 
without jeopardizing adjacent cornponents. The assessrnent of the extent to 
which this requirernent can be fulfilled is a rnajor objective. Hence, further 
analyses will concentrate on reference accident sequences, includihg events 
which have a potential to propagate frorn the rnagnet systern to adjacent 
cornponents. 
The following events are considered to have a potential of failure propagation: 
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- Uncontrolled growing of anormal conducting zone 
- Electric arc outside a coil 
- Electric arc inside a coil 
- Coil deformation or displacement 
- Valurnechange of cryogenic helium. 
5.2.1 Uneontrolled Growing of a Normal Conducting Zone 
The previous investigations have shown the importance of the local magnetic 
fieid on the velocity of a quench propagation and the importance of the helium 
plena. Pressure peaks of the helium in the cable during the quench process will 
need further analysis. 
The progam system MAGS being a modulare system offers a flexible range of 
application. Samecode improvements and verification efforts are recommended. 
5.2.2 Are Outside a Coil 
An arc outside of a coil may occur at the bus bars of a coil. lnitiating events may 
be either a quench inside the coil or a direct failure at the bus bars. lf an arc burns 
there the arc will be pressed to the vacuum duct of the vacuum vessel due to the 
magnet field and may melt a hole in this component. This will Iead to a 'lass of 
vacuum' event being a reference accident sequence of NET/ITER. 
5.2.3 Are Inside a Coil 
As the experiments have shown even in a TF coil an arc will propagate primarily in 
circumferential direction due to the toroidal magnet field. lf we assume that an 
arc occurs at the outermost pancake then the magnet field presses the arc to the 
coil casing. After some time a hole may be burnt into it. Through this hole the arc 
can reach also other systems if the distances aresmall enough. Such a situation 
can be imagined in the upper connection box where all coolant and tritium lines 
to and from the vacuum vessel are accumulated. 
Aim of the analysis proposed is to find out energies consumed resp. available at 
the time when the coil case is locally malten, the size of the hole and, depending 
on that, how far such an arc may reach. 
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5.2.4 Coil Deformation or Displacement 
As stated above the central vault could become unstable locally for some fault 
loading cases. Then the shear keys at both ends of the central vault have to main-
tain the global stability of the whole assembly of the magnets. lf they fail too, 
which remains to be investigated, the coils will move. lt is then of most concern 
whether the radioactivity leading pipes of the blankets will withstand such 
displacements without rupture. 
Large lateral displacements of the upper arches of the TF coils will impact the 
upper connection box containing most of the piping to and from the vacuum 
vessel. Since the arch failure is of unstable type, due to the increasing Ioads with 
growing displacement, more detailed investigations will be needed. 
Rupture of solenoid stack tie rods may Iead to uncontrolled vertical coil move-
ments hitting against the cryostat vessel above and below to the coil assembly. 
Bursting of the outer ring coils may impact the cryostat sidewall by coil fractions. 
5.2.5 Volume Change of Cryogenic Helium 
Volume change of cryogenic helium with the possible consequences of an 
overpressurization of the cryostat and an impact on the vacuum vessel need 
further investigations. On the other hand, gas entry into the cryostat may have an 
influence on the quench propagation of the coils. This is a desired effect directed 
to inherent safety. 
49 
6. References 
[1] ITER Magnets, 
ITER Documentation Series, No. 26, 
IAEA, Vienna, 1991 
[2] ITER Poloidal Field System, 
ITER Documentation Series, No. 27, 
IAEA, Vienna 
[3] N. Mitchell, C. Bottura, 
Design Basis for the Poloidal Field Coils, 
N/P/3520/2/C; ITER-IL-MG-1-0-3, (11.1.1990) 
[4] A. Nyllas, J. Zhang, B. Obst, A. Ulbricht 
Fatigue and Fatigue Crack Growth Properties of 316LN and 
INCOLOY 908 Below 10 K, 
Advances in Cryogenic Engineering. Vol. 38 (1991) pp. 133- 140 
[5] M. Zucchetti, 
lmpurity Concentration Limitsand Activation in Fusion Reactor Structural 
Materials, FUSION TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 9, March 1991, pp. 294-303 
[6] D. Robinson et al., 
Design Basis for the Coil Power Supplies, 
N/P/5300/1/B; ITER-IL-PF-1-0-2, (11.1.1990) 
[7] H. Aiduell et al., 
Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis of the Protection, 
Instrumentation and Control System of NET. 
Especially: 
Availability of PIC Installations for the NET TF Coils System, 
Studsvik INP-89/14, Vol. 3, AB/Y; 
and: 
Availabality of PIC Installations for the NET PF Coils System, 
Studsvik INP-89/15, Vol. 4, AC/Y 
50 
[8] D. Bessette et al., 
Story of Damaged BT 17 Coil ofthe TF Superconducting Magnet of 
TORE SUPRA, 
Proc. 16th Symp. on Fusion Technology, London, Sept. 3-7, 1990, 
Vol 2, pp. 1659-63 
(9] D.B. Montgomery, 
Review of Fusion System Magnet Problems, Proc. Symp. on Fusion 
Engineering, Knoxville, Oct. 1989, IEEE 1989 
[ 1 0] L.C. Cadwallader, 
Magnet Operating Experience Review for Fusion Applications, 
Informal Report EGG-FSP-9977, Nov. 1991 
[11] J.Powelletal., 
Magnet Safety and Reliability in Magnetic Fusion Energy Systems 
Report BN 50658, Brookhaven National Labaratory (1977) 
[ 12] L.R. Turner, 
Safety of Superconducting Fusion Magnets: Twelve Problem Areas, 
ANUFPP!TM-121, Argonne National Labaratory (1979) 
[ 13] F. Arendt, P. Komarek, 
Potential Failures and Hazards in Superconducting Magnet Systems for 
Fusion Reactors 
Nucl. Techn./Fusion, Vol. 1, 1981, p. 552 
[14] P.G. Marston et al., 
Magnet Failure Workshop, Journ. de Physique Colloque, Vol. 45 (1984), 
p.C1-637 
[ 1 5] J. B. Hicks, 
Magnet Failures and Hazards to the Public 
Report CLM-P736, Culham Labaratory (1985) 
51 
[16] SULTAN Group, 
NET-11 TF Coil Systems Studies- Final Report, 
NET-Report EUR-FU/XII-361/85/46 (1985) 
[17] M. Zimmermannet al., 
Failure Modesand Effects Analysis of Fusion Magnet Systems 
PFC/RR 88-17, (Dec. 1988) 
[18] ITER Safety, ITER Documentation Series, No. 36, IAEA, Vienna 1991 
[19] J.S. Herring, K.P. Jüngst, J.L. Jones, H.G. Kraus, 
MSCAP SimulationsofTESPE Magnet Safety Transients, 
Proc. of the 8th Top. Meeting on the Technology of Fusion Energy, 
Salt Lake City, Oct. 9- 13, 1988, 
Fusion Technology, 15 (1989), pp. 945-50 
[20] K.P. Jüngst, H. Kronhardt, M. Oehmann, J.S. Herring, 
Arcing Experiments for Magnet Safety lnvestigations, 
Proc. of the 15th Symp. on Fusion Technology (SOFT), 
Utrecht, Sept. 19- 23, 1988, Vol. 2, pp. 1518-22 
[21] J .S. Herring, K.P. Jüngst, R.J. Thome, 
The Status of Superconducting Magnet Safety Research, 
Proc. 13th Symp. on Fusion Engineering, Knoxville, Tennessee, 
Oct. 2- 6, 1989, IEEE, pp. 32-35 
[22] K.P. Jüngst, H. Kronhardt, 
Electric Ares, Behaviour and lnfluence on Safety of Supercondcucting 
Fusion Magnets, 
IAEA Technical Meeting on Fusion Reactor Safety, Jackson, Apr. 4- 7, 1989 
[23] D.S. Beard, W. Klose, S. Shimamoto, G. Vecsey (eds), 
The IEA Large Coil Task, Development of Superconducting Toroidal Field 
Magnets for Fusion Power, 
Fus. Eng. and Design 7, (1 & 2) 1-232 (1988) 
52 
[24] W. Kramer, R. Meyder, K.P. Jüngst, H. Kronhardt, 
KfK Interna! Report (Nov. 1990) 
[25] J. Raeder, 
Private Communication 
[26] R. Meyder, 
KfK Interna! Report (March 1992) 
[27] W. Bönisch, G. Hailfinger, R. Meyder, 
KfK Interna! Report (April1992) 
[28] K.P. Jüngst, H. Kronhardt, 
KfK Interna! Report (June 1991) 
[29] K.P. Jüngst, H. Kronhardt, 
Missile Generation in Superconducting Magnet Systems, 
tobe published 
[30] N.S. Cheverev et al., 
T-15 Results: Testing of Systems and Parts, Proceeding of 15th SOFT, 
Utrecht, 1988, pp 356-360 
[31] K.P. Jüngst, H. Kronhardt, 
lnfluence of Discharge Voltage on Electrical Arcing in Magnet Systems 
with Short Circuits, 
12th lnt. Conf. on Magnet Technology, Leningrad, June 1991 
IEEE-Transactions on Magnetics, 28 (1992), pp. 263-66 
[32] H.G. Kraus, J.L. Jones, 
Hybrid Finite Difference/Finite Element Solution Method Development 
for Nonlinear Superconducting Magnet and Electrical Circuit Breakdown 
Analysis, 
lnt. Journ. for Numerical Methods in Engineering, Vol. 23 (1986), 1003 -
1022 
53 
[33] S.J. Sackett, 
Effi a Code Calculating the Electromagnetic Field, Force and lnductance in 
Coil Systems of Arbitrary Geometry, 
Lawrence Livermore Labaratory Rept. UCRL 52402 (1978) 
[34] ABAQUS- User Information Manual, Update to Version 4.7, 
Hibbit, Karlsson and Sorensen, lnc. 
[35] S. Raff, E. Wehner, 
KfK InternaIReport (July 1990) 
[36] W. Kramer, R. Meyder, S. Raff, K.P. Jüngst, H. Kronhardt, S. Ciattaglia, 
F. Tarisciotti 
KfK InternaIReport (Sept. 1991) 
[37] S. Raff, E. Wehner, Y.S. Hoang 
KfK Interna! Report (March 1992) 
[38] S. Raff, E. Wehner, Y.S. Hoang 
KfK Interna! Report, ln Preparation 
[39] F. Tarisciotti, S. Ciattaglia, 
Reference Accident Sequences of Magnet Systems: LOCA and LIVA, Final 
Report, 
ENEA, ANT-FUS/RT (92) 2, Feb. 1992 
[40] R. Caporali, F. Tarisciotti, and S. Ciattaglia, 
Safety Analysis of NET Magnet System: LIVA Accident, 
14th IEEE Symposium on Fusion Engineering, San Diego, CA, Sept. 29 -
Oct. 3, 1991 
[41] L.C. Cadwallader, 
Cryogenic System Operating Experience Review for Fusion Applications, 
EGG-FSP-10048, January 1992 
54 
[42] E. Wehner, R. Krieg, R. Meyder, 
Assessment of the Structural Deformations Caused by a Postulated Local 
Break of a Toroidal NET Coil, 
Proc. 15th Symp. on Fusion Technology, Utrecht, NL, 
Sept. 19-23, 1988, Val. 2, pp. 1495-99 
[43] N. Mitchell, L. Bottura, S. Chiocchio, 





The authors wish to acknowledge the valuable comments and contributions by 
R. Krieg and H. Schnauder. 
Thanks are expressed to Mrs. E. Maurerand Mrs. R. Spintig for their assistance in 
the preparation of this report. 
This work has been performed in the framework of the Nuclear Fusion Project of 
the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe and is supported by the European 











~ I ' 
I 
[;] ' ~ PF7U I ' I 0.. 
' 
I 
* :::l & t--
<570 
10500 









' I TF CO/L 
\ ~ 16 EQUALLY SPACED 




Fig. 1: Arrangement of the TF and PF Magnets for ITER [ 1) 
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TC = Thyristor Convertor 
S = Switch 
Fig. 4: TF Power Supply and Protection [1] 
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Fig. 6: Temperatures in Pancake 1. 
Data plotted versus the circumference, 7.5 seconds after quench initiation 
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Fig. 7: Temperatures in Cross Section 4, 
7.5 seconds after quench initiation. Maximumtemperatureis 87 K. 
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Fig. 8: Temperatures in Cross Sec.tion 32, 
7.5 seconds after quench initiation. Maximum temperature is 250 K. The 
highest temperatures are found in the cable space zones. They are 
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on T F - co i ls 
mechanical 
influence 
on TF- coi l case 
ele c tr ical 
inductance 
an PF- coils 
electrical failure 
a f t h e 




Fig. 11: Electrical and Magnetic lnteractions of Electrical Faults in the Magnet 
System 
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